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Abstract
The media frequently describes the 2017 Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ rally as a 
turning point for the alt-right and white supremacist movements. Social movement 
theory suggests that the media attention and public discourse concerning the rally 
may have engendered changes in social identity performance and visibility of the 
alt-right, but this has yet to be empirically tested. The presence of the movement on 
YouTube is of particular interest, as this platform has been referred to as a breeding 
ground for the alt-right. The current study investigates whether there are differences 
in language use between 7142 alt-right and progressive YouTube channels, in addi-
tion to measuring possible changes as a result of the rally. To do so, we create struc-
tural topic models and measure bigram proportions in video transcripts, spanning 
approximately 2 months before and after the rally. We observe differences in topics 
between the two groups, with the ‘alternative influencers’, for example, discussing 
topics related to race and free speech to a larger extent than progressive channels. 
We also observe structural breakpoints in the use of bigrams at the time of the rally, 
suggesting there are changes in language use within the two groups as a result of 
the rally. While most changes relate to mentions of the rally itself, the alternative 
group also shows an increase in promotion of their YouTube channels. In light of 
social movement theory, we argue that language use on YouTube shows that the 
Charlottesville rally indeed triggered changes in social identity performance and vis-
ibility of the alt-right.
Keywords Alt-right · Charlottesville rally · Structural topic modelling · YouTube · 
Quantitative text analysis
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Introduction
On 11 and 12 August 2017, dozens of alt-right, white supremacist and neo-Nazi 
individuals descended on Charlottesville, Virginia. The event, known as the ‘Unite 
the Right’ rally, turned fatal on the second day when a white supremacist deliber-
ately drove into a crowd of counter-protestors, resulting in the death of one person 
and leaving several others injured [1, 2]. In recent years, the rise of the alt-right 
has been accompanied by several other acts of violence and terror attacks motivated 
by white supremacist ideologies, with 18 out of 34 extremist-related deaths in 2017 
attributed to this group [3]. In 2019, 90% of all 42 extremist murders in the United 
States were linked to right-wing extremism [4]. At the same time, alt-right ideolo-
gies have become widespread online. Their content is easily accessible through 
social media platforms, and ideas are amplified on websites such as 4chan [5] and 
Gab [6]. YouTube, in particular, has been described as a breeding ground for the alt-
right [7, 8].
This paper sheds light on the alt-right as a social movement by studying its lan-
guage use in a unique dataset of YouTube video transcripts. We examine whether 
the Charlottesville rally functioned as a critical juncture in the online behaviour of 
the alt-right, and additionally contrast this with language use in a progressive sam-
ple of YouTube channels. In the next section, we discuss the alt-right and the Char-
lottesville rally. Thereafter, we outline the wider social movement literature as well 
as previous work on the effect of offline trigger events for online behaviour. Follow-
ing this, we introduce our empirical examination of differences in language use on 
YouTube within and between alt-right and progressive channels, shortly before and 
after the Charlottesville rally.
The alt‑right and Charlottesville
The alt-right is not defined by a central organisation [9], nor does it ‘offer a coher-
ent or well-developed set of policy proposals’ [10]. Instead, it has been referred to 
as a ‘mix of rightist online phenomena’ [11] with white identity at its core [12]. 
The alt-right is variously characterised as anti-political correctness, anti-immigra-
tion, anti-Semitist, and anti-feminist [12], ideologies which are commonly spread 
online through irony and dark humour. Scholars have begun to study the alt-right as 
a social movement, following the definition of ‘a cluster of performances organised 
around a set of grievances or claims’ [9, 13]. It has been argued that the alt-right, 
mainly through online activity, engages in promoting a shared identity, fostering a 
commitment to a common cause, and proclaiming the ‘worthiness, unity, and size’ 
of its movement [9].
The presence of the alt-right on social media has been particularly salient on 
YouTube [7, 8]. A 2018 report described an ‘Alternative Influencer Network’ on 
YouTube consisting of content creators ‘who range in ideology from mainstream 
libertarian to openly white nationalist’ [8]. It was found that alternative political 
influencers on YouTube adopt strategies of mainstream popular Youtubers to gain 
popularity, engaging in tactics for search engine optimisation and cultivating a 
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relatable ‘underdog’ image [8]. Further research on this network argued that a “sup-
ply-and-demand framework” is needed to understand the popularity of alternative 
influencers, where the ease of uploading and monetizing fringe political videos on 
YouTube enables a supply that is in demand for viewers who feel alienated from 
mainstream media [14]. It has also been noted that the audience of alt-right YouTube 
videos is highly engaged with the content, displaying more likes and comments per 
view than other less extreme or mainstream media videos [14]. While some videos 
or channels of extreme influencers may have been demonetized because advertis-
ers do not want to be associated with the content, many have adopted alternative 
strategies to raise revenue. This includes the use of crowdfunding platforms such as 
Patreon or so-called “super-chats” where viewers make a donation for their message 
to be read out on a livestream [14].
After the Charlottesville rally, various media outlets declared that ‘white nation-
alists are winning’ [15] and ‘the genie is out of the bottle’ [1]. In addition, President 
Trump stated that there was ‘blame on both sides’ [16], which prompted the sugges-
tion that his claims ‘reinvigorated’ the alt-right movement [16]. In the aftermath of 
the rally, various reports also noted that white nationalists have entered mainstream 
conversation [1, 17] and some say they were aided in doing so by the Trump admin-
istration [17]. Drawing from the study of protests by extreme right-wing groups and 
other social movements, one might argue that that the rally was not only important 
for the effects it had outside of the movement (e.g., in the media and politics), but 
also within the movement itself [18, 19], which could be assessed by studying its 
YouTube videos. In the next section, we outline some of the social movement litera-
ture to better understand the alt-right and possible effects of the Charlottesville rally.
Social movement theory
Social movements have been studied for decades [20–25]. One definition states that 
a social movement is a group containing ‘a plurality of individuals, groups and/or 
organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared col-
lective identities’ [20]. Within these movements, the collective identity of the group 
can be actively emphasized through distinguishing between “us” and “them” [22, 
24]. These identities crucially need to be “framed” to mobilize supporters, where 
the frame generally serves to identify an injustice which can be addressed through a 
collective agency [25]. Importantly, it is consistently shown that social movements 
make extensive use of the internet for communication and organisation [21, 23]. 
Indeed, further definitions of social movements state that resources are generally 
shared through informal networks [21, 26]. This phenomenon has also been studied 
within the context of white supremacist groups, for which the internet serves to rein-
force their sense of collective identity, where white supremacy and difficulties faced 
by white people are emphasized [27].
Elements of social movement theory propose that people engage in social iden-
tity performance, which refers to behaviour that serves to express the norms of the 
social group one aims to belong to [28, 29]. Such behaviour includes affirming ones 
social identity, conforming to a social movement, strengthening one’s identity, or 
 Journal of Computational Social Science
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mobilising others [28]. Within the context of the alt-right, social identity perfor-
mance may, for example, include using community-specific language [5] or memes 
online (e.g., Pepe the Frog, a popular internet meme appropriated by the alt-right [5, 
10]), or to publicly adopt symbols related to white supremacism.
Research on the effect of media coverage and public discourse on social move-
ments might explain the potential effect of the Charlottesville rally on the alt-right 
[30, 31]. For example, research on right-wing violence in Germany suggests that 
both positive and negative reactions from public figures to violent events may help 
to lend prominence to the movement [31]. That is, even if one aims to condemn a 
violent movement’s message, the message is (at least partially) reproduced [31]. By 
studying newspaper sources, this line of research suggested that discursive opportu-
nities, summarised as public visibility, resonance, and legitimacy affected the behav-
iour of right-wing movements, measured in terms of violent events against different 
target groups [31]. Public visibility refers to the number of outlets reporting on the 
movement and the prominence of the movement’s message within those outlets [31]. 
Resonance is defined as the (positive or negative) reaction from public figures to 
the movement’s message as well as the associated ripple effect in the media [31]. 
Legitimacy involves the general public’s support of a message [31]. Similar discur-
sive opportunities were also studied in relation to the rise in popularity of right-
wing populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands [30]. In a similar vein, visibility (e.g., 
the extensive media coverage), resonance (e.g., responses to the rally from President 
Trump and other politicians), and legitimacy (e.g., subsequent protests and vigils 
denouncing the rally [32]) can be observed in the context of the alt-right and Char-
lottesville rally.
The effect of discursive opportunities has yet to be examined for the specific case 
of the alt-right and the Charlottesville rally. If indeed the visibility of the alt-right 
increased following the rally, the message of the movement resonated in the media 
and public discourse, and the alt-right gained legitimacy through acknowledgement 
from opponents and the general public, we may expect to see changes in behaviour 
within the movement. Within the context of social identity performance, one may 
expect to see strengthened social identity consolidation within the alt-right move-
ment as a result of the rally, President Trump’s comments, and the media coverage 
of the rally. After the rally, we might expect increased expression of norms from 
the alt-right movement, for example in the form of stronger endorsement or more 
extreme expressions of in-group ideology. As has been raised previously, such 
behaviour may serve to further strengthen the movement or mobilise others to join.
In summary, the Charlottesville rally may have had an effect both within and 
beyond the alt-right, namely on their social identity performance and visibility, 
respectively. Similar theories have been proposed within the study of protests by 
extreme right-wing groups and other social movements. Large (sudden) protests are 
sometimes said to not only have important effects outside a social movement but also 
within the movement itself by further radicalising or mobilising (non) members [18, 
19]. Within this context, it is said that protests sometimes can trigger critical junc-
tures that bring about abrupt and lasting changes both within and beyond a social 
movement [19]. In the next section, we further examine the effect of offline trigger 
events on online behaviour, as well as the interaction between the two domains.
1 3
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Reactions to ‘trigger’ events
A large body of research has examined the interplay between online activity and 
offline events, particularly how both domains may influence each other. Early work 
in this area already suggested that the internet was transforming collective action by 
having a mobilizing influence on its users [33]. For instance, it has been argued that 
the online discussion within social movements influences the politicized identity 
of individuals (e.g., identification with a movement), which in turn influences their 
intentions to engage in collective action (e.g., attending a rally) [34]. Similar claims 
have been made in light of the Arab spring, where online activity has been said to 
enable the formation of a new social identity (i.e., opposing the government) and 
mobilized people to engage in mass protests [35]. Besides political contexts, it has 
for example also been shown that online interactions in addiction recovery support 
groups (e.g., affirmation through likes, identification with the recovery community 
expressed in language) predicted offline retention in the program [36, 37]. Besides 
offline (collective) action, the online activity also seems to have an effect on offline 
media. For example, a ‘symbiotic’ relationship has been identified between Twitter 
feeds and top newspapers. Examining tweets from 2016 US presidential candidates 
and issue agendas in five US newspapers, it was found that tweets (e.g., on employ-
ment, immigration, national security) frequently predicted news agendas, and vice 
versa [38]. In another study, it was suggested Tweets can be used to infer voter pref-
erences [39]. Political party mentions and tweet sentiment were said to reflect actual 
election results in Germany [39].
Of particular interest is the measurement of (hate) crimes in response to specific 
‘trigger’ events, such as terrorist attacks [40]. Several studies have reported spikes in 
hate crimes following 9/11 or the 7/7 London attacks [41, 42]. In the online sphere, 
similar patterns can be observed. A survey conducted between 2013 and 2015 also 
showed that young people in Finland witnessed increased hate online shortly after 
the 2015 Paris attacks [43]. In the aftermath of the 2013 Woolwich terrorist attack, 
researchers observed hate directed at black and minority ethnic groups in Tweets 
directly related to the attack [40]. In another study on information flows on Twit-
ter in the aftermath of the Woolwich attack, it was found that tweet sentiment was 
predictive of the number retweets and their timespan (i.e., time between first and 
last retweet). Offline news reports also (positively) predicted the number of retweets 
on the same topic [44]. Another study examined the effect of jihadist terrorism and 
Islamophobic attacks on hate speech on Twitter and Reddit, measured over a period 
of 19  months shortly after 13 extremist attacks [45]. It was found that, following 
jihadist terrorist attacks, hate speech targeting Muslims, particularly those advocat-
ing violence, increased more after terror attacks compared to a counterfactual simu-
lation [45]. An increase in hate speech targeting Muslims was not found following 
Islamophobic attacks, with the exception of messages posted after the 2017 Finsbury 
Park Mosque attack [45]. Hate speech and white nationalist rhetoric have also been 
measured during the 2016 US elections on Twitter, using a dictionary approach with 
Hatebase, the Racial Slur Database, and the Anti-Defamation League’s database of 
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white-nationalist language1 [46]. Tweets were examined by means of an interrupted 
time series analysis, showing a spike in hate speech in the Trump dataset following 
the imposed travel ban in early 2017 [46].
A small number of studies have looked at the specific effect of the Charlottesville 
rally on online behaviour. In a qualitative study of Twitter accounts of two alt-right 
and one far-left organisation in the 6 weeks leading up to the Charlottesville rally, it 
was observed that the two sides frequently targeted each other, framing the opposing 
group as the enemy [47]. Manual examination of the tweets showed that the alt-right 
accounts frequently referred to ‘the left’ and ‘liberals’ as unpatriotic and communist. 
At the same time, the far-left accounts dubbed the alt-right ‘suit and tie Nazis’. Fur-
thermore, both the alt-right and far-left groups incited violence in the weeks lead-
ing up to the Charlottesville rally and called for action among their supporters. A 
tweet from one of the alt-right groups read ‘The left is preparing to lynch mobs to 
descend on the Unite The Right rally in Charlottesville, VA… This is going to be 
fun’ [47]. Other research has shown that anti-Semitic memes and rhetoric increased 
after the 2016 US elections and the Charlottesville rally [48]. Several million posts 
and images from 4chan and Gab were studied for racial slurs and anti-Semitic terms, 
with a case study of a specific anti-Semitic meme showing that such content also 
spreads to mainstream platforms such as Twitter and Reddit [48].
Aims of this paper
Taken together, the theoretical lines discussed would suggest that the Charlottesville 
rally functioned as a critical juncture for the alt-right, engendering changes in online 
social identity performance and visibility of the social movement. To empirically 
examine this claim, the present study takes a closer look at a network of alterna-
tive political influencers [7] (hereafter, ‘alternative group’), by examining You-
Tube video transcripts extracted from channels by these individuals. These video 
transcripts are compared to those from YouTube channels whose political orienta-
tion can be considered more progressive (hereafter, ‘progressive group’), to assess 
whether the Charlottesville rally also had an effect outside of the alt-right movement 
itself.
This paper has two aims. First, we compare language use between the alternative 
and progressive group in a sixteen-week timeframe surrounding the Charlottesville 
rally. Second, we assess whether the rally had an effect on language use within the 
two groups. For the alternative group, we do not postulate any directional hypoth-
eses about changes in language use. Nevertheless, in light of the social movement 
and social identity performance literature, we expect to see changes in social iden-
tity performance after the rally reflected in language use on YouTube. For the pro-
gressive group, we do not claim that the channels studied act as a social movement, 
and thus we have no expectations of social identity performance. However, we are 
1 See https ://hateb ase.org/, http://www.rsdb.org/ and https ://www.adl.org/educa tion-and-resou rces/resou 
rce-knowl edge-base/hate-symbo ls.
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interested in seeing whether the channels lend any discursive opportunities to the 
alt-right through language use in their videos, thereby potentially contributing to the 
increased visibility of the alternative group.
The first aim is addressed through structural topic modelling, to compare 
the prevalence and content of topics between the two groups. The second aim is 
addressed using a word frequency approach, in which we examine the frequency 
of common phrases before and after the Charlottesville rally, searching for sudden 
increases or decreases as a result of the rally.
Method
Data availability statement
Supplemental materials, data and code to reproduce the analysis are available on the 
Open Science Framework: https ://osf.io/yedt7 /.
Data
Channel selection
YouTube channels were selected for analysis from two main sources. First, we drew 
from the list of 65 YouTube users referred to as the ‘Alternative Influence Network’ 
in the 2018 Data & Society report on political influencers [8]. Based on this list, 
we searched for a designated YouTube channel for each individual. If an individual 
did not have a designated YouTube channel or their channel was no longer avail-
able, we searched for the individual’s name through the YouTube search function. 
For example, videos featuring Alex Jones (who was banned from YouTube so no 
longer has a designated channel) were obtained through the search query ‘alex jones 
full show’. The group of alternative YouTube channels consisted of 56 channels and 
search queries used for transcript retrieval. Because data collection was done ret-
rospectively, some channels appearing in the Data & Society report may not have 
been available (also when searched) because they were banned or deleted (total of 9 
channels, 13.85%). Second, for the comparison group of progressives, we drew from 
two online lists of progressive YouTube channels.2 Since the lists referred to specific 
existing channels, search queries for specific persons were not necessary. In total, 13 
progressive channels and 56 alternative channels were used for transcript retrieval. 
For all channels and search queries, we retrieved the URLs for all available videos 
on 1 October 2018.
2 http://the20 20pro gress ive.com/top-13-progr essiv e-news-shows -youtu be/ and https ://mediu m.com/@
tejaz z89/top-5-youtu be-chann els-to-follo w-if-you-are-a-true-progr essiv e-ee2ab c78d5 8f.
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Transcript retrieval
The method for retrieving YouTube video transcripts follows the procedure of 
related research [49, 50]. To retrieve the transcripts, a Python script was writ-
ten using www.downs ub.com to obtain XML-encoded transcripts. The transcripts 
were either automatically generated by YouTube or manually added by the You-
Tube user. In some cases, no transcript was available, because users disabled the 
transcript availability. XML-tags and time-stamps were removed, resulting in a 
single, non-punctuated string for each video transcript.
Data cleaning
Videos that contained fewer than 100 words were not considered for analysis, fol-
lowing previous work on YouTube transcripts [49, 50]. Using R software, each 
video was checked for English language and was excluded if it contained fewer 
than 50% English words. Videos were also excluded if they contained fewer than 
90% ASCII characters. The video transcript strings were lower-cased and stop-
words, unnecessary whitespace or punctuation were removed using the R pack-
ages tidytext [51], tm [52] and qdap [53].
Sample
To capture the immediate and continuing effects of the rally we sampled video 
transcripts up to approximately 2 months after the rally, as well as an equal time-
frame preceding the rally. Previous works assessing the online effects of offline 
events have examined timeframes ranging from 2 weeks [44], a month [39, 40, 
43], to one or several years [42, 45, 54]. Because no consensus seems to exist in 
the literature, we opted for a middle ground of 2 months pre- and post-event (data 
from a longer timeframe is available on request). This resulted in a total sample 
of videos spanning 16 weeks (i.e., 8 weeks pre- and post-rally). Descriptive sta-
tistics for this sample are given in Table 1.
Table 1  Descriptive statistics video sample
Alternative Progressive
Total videos 2684 4458
Total word count 3,868,744 2,804,703
Word count Mean: 1448 (SD: 1612)
Min: 34, Max: 12,085
Mean: 632 (SD: 860)
Min: 33, Max: 11,645
View count Mean: 120,639 (SD: 234,513)
Min: 2, Max: 17,340,303
Mean: 24,787 (SD: 47,468)
Min: 12, Max: 2,475,766
1 3
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Analysis plan
Structural topic model
To assess the differences in language use between the alternative and progressive 
groups, we construct a structural topic model. This method can be used to auto-
matically extract underlying latent topics in a corpus [55, 56]. Common approaches 
include  Latent Dirichlet Allocation [55] and Correlated Topic Models [57], proba-
bilistic models which are based on the assumption that a piece of text consists of a 
mix of topics, which in turn are a mix of words with probabilities of belonging to a 
topic [55, 56]. A structural topic model is a type of Correlated Topic Model, with 
the added benefit that one can incorporate document-level covariates (e.g., docu-
ment author, political orientation, date) and assess whether these covary with topic 
prevalence (i.e., the degree to which documents in a corpus are assigned a specific 
topic) and content (i.e., the terms in a topic) [56].
We first define a document-frequency-matrix with both unigrams (e.g., ‘presi-
dent’) and bigrams (e.g., ‘donald trump’) in the corpus, which is then used to con-
struct the structural topic model. We include group (alternative vs. progressive) as 
a covariate for topic prevalence and content. Topic models are fit with a varying 
number of topics,3 after which we select the best fitting model based on the trade-
off between semantic coherence and exclusivity [56, 58], two metrics frequently 
used to assess whether a topic is semantically useful [56, 59]. Semantic coherence 
is a measure of the co-occurrence of highly probable words in a topic and has been 
shown to correlate with expert judgments of topic quality [58]. It has been proposed 
that a measure of exclusivity of words to topics is needed to further determine topic 
quality, otherwise, several topics may be represented by the same highly probable 
words if one relies on semantic coherence alone. Exclusive topics are made up of 
words that have a high probability under one topic, but a low probability under other 
topics [59].
After selecting a model, we present topics for which a significant effect of the 
covariate group was found for topic prevalence (i.e., a significant difference between 
alternative and progressive channels), in order of total expected topic proportion for 
the corpus. Based on manual inspection of frequent and exclusive topic words [56, 
60], we assign labels to topics. We also present a selection of three topics along with 
the words which differed between the alternative and progressive groups, to illus-
trate how the alternative and progressive groups talk about the same topic in differ-
ent ways (i.e., content differences).
Word frequency
To examine possible changes in word frequency within the alternative and progres-
sive group as a result of the rally, we compute the frequency of all bigrams for each 
3 20, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 topics.
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week in both groups separately. By dividing these values by the total number of 
bigrams for each day, we obtain the daily proportion for each bigram. Thereafter, we 
can assess whether there is a structural breakpoint in the proportion of each bigram 
as a result of the rally. This is done by means of the Chow test [61, 62], with which 
we determine whether a breakpoint in the intercept and slope occurred at the time of 
the rally. To do so, we test for the equality between a model of bigram proportions 
before the Charlottesville rally and a model of bigram proportions after the rally. In 
both models, the proportion of each bigram is represented as a function of Date (day 
on which the proportion was measured, between 15 June and 7 Oct 2017). We com-
pute an F-value for the equality between the two models for each bigram and report 
those which are found to differ significantly pre- and post-rally. We also report the 
associated Cohen’s d effect size, where a value of of 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 constitute a 
small, medium, and large effect, respectively [70]. In addition, we present associated 
intercept and slope changes.
Results
Structural topic model
We decided on a structural topic model with 40 topics based on examination of 
semantic coherence and exclusivity (see the OSF page for results with different 
numbers of topics). Thereafter, we found that the covariate Group was significant for 
the prevalence of 30 topics. Figure 1 shows the topics for which Group significantly 
covaried with topic prevalence. We assigned labels (e.g., ‘Obamacare’) based on the 
examination of highly probable as well as frequent and exclusive words. The alter-
native group discussed more of the topics which were labelled as swearing, filler 
words, future focus, economy & business, race, immigration, women, free speech, 
internet, Fox News, police, social justice, mainstream media, personal concerns, 
Fig. 1  Topic prevalence per group
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radical Islam, and gay marriage. The progressive channels focused more on Donald 
Trump, taxes, healthcare, YouTube, the presidency, party politics, hate, law, media 
investigations, presidential candidates, Obamacare, voting, foreign affairs and Asia/
nuclear weapons.
Table 2 shows how three topics are discussed differently by alternative and pro-
gressive channels (full list of topics available on the OSF). By including topic con-
tent as a covariate, we are able to see which words are more associated with each 
group per topic. For example, the ‘social justice’ topic is discussed as a ‘movement’ 
and ‘resistance’ by progressive channels, whereas the alternative group uses the 
term ‘identity politics’. The topic of ‘women’ is discussed with terms referring to 
sexuality by both groups, but the progressive group also includes terms referring to 
Table 2  Topic content per group
Topic label Group Common terms
Social justice Alternative diversity, social justice, google, differences, identity politics
Progressive movement, conference, resistance, africa, organization
Women Alternative women, female, sexual, male, rape
Progressive women, sex, father, child, family
Race Alternative white people, black people, racist, blacks, racism
Progressive charlottesville, white supremacist, racism, racist, nazis
Table 3  Ten bigrams with largest Chow test (F) statistic in an alternative group
a For all coefficients (F, intercept and slope changes): p <0.001
b Slope change estimates have been multiplied by 10,000 for interpretability
Bigram Chow test (F)a Effect size d Intercept change Slope  changeb
White nationalist 42.84 0.89 1.12 − 0.64
Happen charlottesville 38.09 0.84 0.20 − 0.11
Hit bell 35.47 0.81 0.26 − 0.15
Video bitcoin 31.85 0.76 0.20 − 0.11
Subscribe hit 28.92 0.73 0.24 − 0.14
Charlottesville virginia 28.10 0.72 0.11 − 0.06
nazi flag 26.86 0.70 0.19 − 0.11
Descript patreon 26.70 0.70 0.19 − 0.11
Neonazi white 26.00 0.69 0.11 − 0.06
Begin video 25.90 0.69 0.33 − 0.19
 Journal of Computational Social Science
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family. Although both topics discuss ‘race’ with terms relating to racism, the pro-
gressive group uses terms such as ‘white supremacist’ and ‘nazis’.
Word frequency approach
We show the ten bigrams for which the Chow test F statistic (and associated effect 
size), indicative of a joint breakpoint in intercept and slope, was largest,4 in the 
Table 4  Ten bigrams with largest Chow test (F) statistic for progressive group
a For all coefficients (F, intercept and slope changes): p < 0.001
b Slope change estimates have been multiplied by 10,000 for interpretability
Bigram Chow test (F)a Effect size d Intercept change Slope  changeb
White nationalist 42.84 0.89 1.12 − 0.64
Happen charlottesville 38.09 0.84 0.20 − 0.11
Hit bell 35.47 0.81 0.26 − 0.15
Video bitcoin 31.85 0.76 0.20 − 0.11
Subscribe hit 28.92 0.73 0.24 − 0.14
charlottesville virginia 28.10 0.72 0.11 − 0.06
Nazi flag 26.86 0.70 0.19 − 0.11
Descript patreon 26.70 0.70 0.19 − 0.11
Neonazi white 26.00 0.69 0.11 − 0.06
Begin video 25.90 0.69 0.33 − 0.19
Fig. 2  Observed proportion of three bigrams with largest F-value in an alternative group
4 Further bigrams that exhibited breakpoints are available in the supplemental materials.
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alternative group (Table 3) and progressive group (Table 4). We also show the direc-
tion and magnitude of intercept and slope changes after the rally; please note that 
the values of  slope changes were small (albeit statistically significant and large in 
terms of effect size d) and, therefore have been multiplied by 10,000 for interpret-
ability. Among the top ten bigrams with breakpoints for both groups, the majority 
relate to the rally itself, such as ‘white nationalist’ and ‘happen charlottesville’. Note 
that some bigrams showed a breakpoint in both groups, namely, ‘white nationalist’, 
‘happen charlottesville’, ‘charlottesville virginia’, and ‘neonazi white’. In the alter-
native group, several bigrams unrelated to the rally (e.g., ‘hit bell’, ‘video bitcoin’) 
also exhibit strong breakpoints. In the progressive group, only one bigram with a 
strong breakpoint in the top ten seems to be unrelated to the rally, namely ‘hurricane 
maria’. To further illustrate the bigram proportion breakpoints, we show the progres-
sion of the first three (based on the magnitude of the Chow test F) bigrams for the 
alternative group (Fig.  2) and the progressive group (Fig.  3). In both groups, the 
proportion of the bigrams depicted significantly increases in terms of intercept, with 
slight (negative) changes in slopes.   
Discussion
The current study examined language use for alternative and progressive YouTube 
channels around the time of the Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ rally. The aims of 
this paper were to compare language use between the groups surrounding the rally 
and to assess whether the rally had an effect on language use within the two groups. 
Fig. 3  Observed proportions of three bigrams with largest F-value in the progressive group
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We examined language use in both groups in terms of structural topic models and 
searched for structural breakpoints in a change of content as a result of the rally. We 
consider the outcome of both approaches, in turn, followed by an interpretation of 
the results in light of social movement theory.
Differences between alternative and progressive channels
The first line of inquiry examined whether there were structural differences in the 
prevalence and content of topics between groups. This analysis illustrates the mat-
ters discussed in videos throughout the  studied period in the two groups. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, several topics in both groups related to politics and current events 
(e.g., taxes, healthcare and the  economy). We found that the prevalence of the 
majority of topics covaried with the political orientation of channels (alternative or 
progressive). For instance, topics that may be loosely associated with the ‘ideology’ 
of the alt-right were found to be used more by the alternative group, such as race, 
immigration, radical Islam, gay marriage, and free speech [11, 12]. Indeed, the con-
cept of free speech has frequently been linked to the alt-right and white nationalism, 
where the right to free speech is used to “advance racist and sexist ideas” [63]. In 
a similar vein, discussions relating to women’s and LGBT rights as well as social 
justice which appeared in our corpus have also been linked to the far right [64], a 
further potential indicator of expressing social norms within this group. The topic 
of so-called mainstream media was also discussed more by alternative channels, 
as well as Fox News in particular. In contrast, the progressive channels discussed 
Donald Trump to a larger extent, as well as other more general current affairs, such 
as the Democratic and Republican parties, legal matters, Obamacare, and foreign 
politics. Interestingly, we also observed a difference in the prevalence of swearing, 
which was significantly higher for alternative influencers. Swearing may be a way 
of conforming to a social group, and our results suggest that this kind of language 
is more common among alternative than progressive YouTube channels. The con-
tent of topics further elucidated differences between groups, for example, the way 
in which the alternative and progressive channels discussed the topic of race with 
differential terms, with the latter using terms that seem to condemn racism (e.g., 
‘white supremacist’, ‘nazis’). In short, the structural topic models indeed show that 
there are differences in topics between alternative and progressive YouTube chan-
nels. Some of these patterns in topics may support previous claims that the alt-right 
behaves as a social movement [9].
Effects of the rally within alternative and progressive channels
The word frequency approach showed the rally had an effect on language use within 
the two groups, illustrated by several breakpoints in bigram proportions that coin-
cided with the Charlottesville rally. Unsurprisingly, the use of words relating to the 
rally (e.g., confederate monument, white nationalist, white supremacist) increased at 
this point. While the proportions of these bigrams all exhibited sudden increases, the 
mentions did decrease over time in the post-rally timeframe. This possibly reflects 
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a ‘natural’ descending trend for discussions of an event as time progresses, which 
potentially adds to the justification of measuring bigram proportions over time to 
assess reactions to events in language.
Although there was some overlap between groups in bigram use, it also appears 
that both groups discussed the events in a different light. The progressive group 
increasingly mentions ‘white supremacists’ after the rally, whereas the alternative 
group increasingly mentions ‘white nationalists’. These differences in terminology 
seem to reflect a more general divide between groups. Indeed, ‘white supremacists’ 
is a term preferred by people who study or condemn the movement, but the term is 
not preferred among the extreme right itself [12]. Among the alt-right, the preferred 
term is ‘white nationalist’, which indeed emerges from our data [12]. This prefer-
ence relates to the wish to establish separate white nations, in contrast to multiracial 
nations where whites are the dominant (‘supreme’) group [12]. One could argue that 
this difference in terminology may reflect increased expressions of in-group (alt-
right) norms, an aspect of social identity performance.
Further breakpoints observed in the progressive group refer to several details 
related to the rally, such as the confederate statue of Robert Lee, the removal of 
which gave rise to the Charlottesville rally [65]. A strong increase within progres-
sive post-rally videos was observed for the mention of counter-protestors, high-
lighting potential condemnation of the rally and the violence that ensued against 
counter-protestors [66]. Interestingly, none of these details appear in the top ten of 
breakpoints for the alternative group. We do not propose that these patterns in lan-
guage use provide evidence for social identity performance on part of the progres-
sive group, as we studied a user-generated and highly heterogenous list of channels, 
for which, in contrast to the alternative group, no claims have been made that they 
form a specific social movement. However, mentions of the rally on part of the pro-
gressive group may have lent further discursive opportunities and resulting visibility 
to the alternative group [30, 31].
Interestingly, a large number of the top ten bigrams in the alternative group for 
which a breakpoint was observed did not relate to the rally, but the promotion of 
YouTube channels, for instance urging viewers to subscribe to a channel, enable 
notifications, or donate to Patreon, a platform where content creators can crowd-
source donations [67]. This behaviour lends further support to previous findings that 
the alternative YouTubers promote their channels such as mainstream influencers, 
and monetize their videos through donations to create a devoted fanbase [8, 14]. In 
short, the examination of bigram proportion breakpoints showed that the Charlottes-
ville rally did seem to have an effect on language use in both groups separately.
The alt‑right as a social movement
Both the language differences between and within the progressive and alternative 
video transcripts can be interpreted in light of social movement theory, and also 
add to our understanding of the effect of offline events on online behaviour. First, 
we observed several topics prevalent among alternative channels that could be seen 
as in line with the social identity of the alt-right. Swearing, distrust in mainstream 
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media, white nationalism, and an emphasis on free speech distinguished the alterna-
tive group from the progressive group. Second, we saw marked changes in language 
after the Charlottesville rally. The alternative YouTubers not only discussed the rally 
but seemingly also promoted their channels more. While the further examination 
of the contexts in which these calls are made will be needed, the fact that (positive) 
breakpoints (in intercept) appear at the time of the rally may be a sign of mobilising 
others, urging viewers to show their support for the alternative channels and related 
movements. Indeed, if these calls are a direct result of the rally, the event may be 
viewed as a critical juncture for the alt-right movement, where the rally served as a 
triggering event for increased social identity performance and mobilisation, aimed 
at strengthening the movement. Furthermore, the progressive group was also shown 
to lend resonance and visibility to the alt-right by discussing the rally, even if con-
demning language (e.g., ‘white supremacist’ over ‘white nationalist’) was used. 
These discursive opportunities may, in turn, have fuelled social identity performance 
on part of the alt-right [30, 31]. That is, by discussing and even condemning the alt-
right rally, the progressive group lends further resonance and visibility to the move-
ment [31]. All in all, results of this study may support the notion that the alt-right 
behaves as a social movement and that the (offline) Charlottesville rally had an effect 
on online social identity performance within the alt-right on YouTube, and possibly 
also outside of the movement as demonstrated by analyses of progressive YouTube 
video transcripts.
Limitations and future work
The current study is not without limitations. First, data selection and subsequent 
operations may have impacted the results of our analysis. For example, the sources 
that we have drawn on for the YouTube videos were unbalanced in nature, with the 
progressive sample consisting of more videos than the alternative sample. Further-
more, the two groups also differed in terms of view counts and video length, both 
factors which may have impacted on language use. In addition, while the alterna-
tive channels were drawn from a research report, the list of progressive channels 
was drawn from user-generated online lists. Future research may be aimed at curat-
ing an expert-verified or crowd-sourced dataset of channels with different politi-
cal biases.5 Other search strategies to identify alt-right channels that do not rely on 
keyword searches, for example using hyperlinks posted on alt-right forums [68], 
should also be considered in future work. Furthermore, when we selected videos for 
analysis only transcripts with more than 100 words and a pre-specified percentage 
of English words were retained. These decisions were guided by previous research 
[49, 50] and our aim to retain only high-quality transcripts suitable for topic model-
ling. A full dataset without these filters applied is available for other researchers to 
experiment with other constraints. In a similar vein, researchers may be interested 
5 Similar to https ://media biasf actch eck.com/ and https ://www.allsi des.com/media -bias/media -bias-ratin 
gs but for YouTube channels.
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in examining longer or shorter timeframes surrounding the Charlottesville rally or 
even other events, and further data from our transcript retrieval (all videos available 
until 1 October 2018) is available on request. Lastly, transcript quality may have var-
ied based on whether they were generated through automatic speech recognition or 
manually reviewed and/or added to a video. YouTube notes that automatic captions 
may be inaccurate due to mispronunciations, accents, or dialect.6 Nevertheless, rely-
ing on the provided captions was the most straightforward way to obtain transcripts, 
and future work may examine what the effect is of different automatic speech recog-
nition technologies on linguistic analyses.
Topic modelling involves several decisions on part of the researcher. For instance, 
various approaches exist for selecting the number of topics for a model, with no 
consensus in the research community [56]. Furthermore, assigning labels to topics 
is based on the interpretation of the researcher, with decisions highly sensitive to 
human bias. Nevertheless, we provide alternative models (with different numbers 
of topics) and further terms associated with topics on our OSF project page, for the 
reader to examine the outcome of our analyses, giving way to alternative explana-
tions. Furthermore, some topics were difficult to interpret (e.g., ‘Filler words’ and 
‘Future focus’), mostly because they were composed of parts-of-speech with little 
meaning, or because the words did not form a coherent topic, and merely consisted 
of words that were used in the same way.
A bag-of-words approach utilised in both the topic modelling and the word fre-
quency approach also holds its limitations. Specifically, bag-of-words models dis-
regard word order and context. Furthermore, when measuring the prevalence of 
bigrams, polarity words or adjectives (e.g., not, very, super) that preceded each 
bigram may not have been captured. This issue may be solved in future using tri-
grams, although relevant n-grams that occur even further away from the keyword 
will still not be captured and further context will still be disregarded. As has been 
raised in the discussion, the breakpoints we observed only show that there was a 
change in frequency (proportion) of a bigram, and say nothing about the context 
in which bigrams occurred. For example, mentions of ‘white nationalist’ may have 
appeared in a negative context in the progressive group, and a positive context in the 
alternative group, but further analyses will be needed to make such claims. A further 
noteworthy solution to this problem is the use of word embeddings, an approach 
used to learn vector representations for individual words that aim to capture seman-
tic relationships between words based on the contexts in which they appear. This 
approach has already been used within the context of the Charlottesville rally, show-
ing that US media associated African-Americans (e.g., the term ‘black’) less with 
negative character traits (e.g., ‘silly’, ‘extreme’) after the rally [69].
It can be argued that understanding changes in the language use of potentially 
violent groups on social media may be of particular interest to policymakers and 
security officials aiming to prevent or de-escalate violence. Future research may 
focus on extending the present approach to measuring changes in language over time 
on other social media platforms where alt-right supporters are active, such as 8Kun 
6 https ://suppo rt.googl e.com/youtu be/answe r/63735 54?hl=en.
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and Gab. It may also be of interest to measure concepts other than topics and n-gram 
frequencies, such as hate speech and abusive language, in response to the Char-
lottesville rally and perhaps other events of interest. Although it is beyond the scope 
of the current paper, a follow-up study of the specific contexts in which certain top-
ics and n-grams occur may be interesting. For example, is the sentiment regarding 
‘white people’ or ‘feminism’ negative or positive in polarity?
Conclusion
Following the violent rally in Charlottesville, the alt-right received significant atten-
tion in the media and public discourse. As a result, we expected to see differences 
in social identity performance and visibility of the alt-right movement, which was 
measured through examining language use. Contrasting a unique dataset of You-
Tube video transcripts from alternative, right-leaning channels to progressive, left-
leaning channels, the present investigation indeed observed differences in language 
within and between the alternative and progressive groups. Results potentially 
reflect changes in social identity performance and visibility after the rally, as well as 
differences between the two groups more generally.
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